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The 'Washington Consensus' analysis and policies are being disputed
both analytically and fortheir effectiveness.Thispaper surveys first the
debate on the definition of the 'Washington Consensus' vis-a-vis its
apparent developmental shortcomings. Then it surveys the major areas
where the 'Washington Consensus' isjudged asafailure (with particular
emphasis on the crises ofthe 1990s).In the nextpart it presents the main
responses to the 'crisis' of the 'Washington Consensus'. Its supporters
are categorised in tre fundamentalists and the reformists whereas its
opponents are divided in thepost-WashingtonConsensus adherents and
the Marxist critics. It is argued that the Marxist perspective offers a




INTRODUCTION: THE DEBATE ABOUT THE DEFINITION
The term 'Washington Consensus' was coined in 1989 by John
Williamson (Williamson (2004b)).It was introduced in a period when
the Keynesian dominance in economic theory and policy had collapsed
-after the mid-1970s crisis and Keynesianism's apparent inability to
solve it-and neo-liberalism (promoted by the Reagan and Thatcher
administrations in the US and the UK respectively) had become the
new orthodoxy. Williamson's aim was to codify that part of the neo-
liberal analysis and policy proposals which have become commonly
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accepted within Development Theory and particularly in the circles of
the big developmental institutions (primarily the IMF and the World
Bank) seated in Washington. In Williamson's (2000,p.254) own words
his effort 'was an attempt to distill which of the policy initiatives that
have emanated from Washington during the years of conservative
ideology had won inclusion in the intellectual mainstream rather than
being cast aside once Ronald Reagan was no longer on the political
scene'. Thus, 'Washington' refers to the influential circles and
institutions based in Washington. And 'Consensus' refers to the part
ofneo-liberal policy prescriptions that had been widely accepted. There
is another geographical dimension in the term 'Washington Consensus'.
Its policy prescriptions were primarily issued for the Latin American
economies in the 1990s,although they subsequently spread to the rest
of the developing and less developed countries. Again in Williamson's
(2000, p.251) own words, the term refers 'to the lowest common
denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-
based institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989'. Williamson
(1990, 2000, p.252-3) summarizes these policy prescriptions in ten
propositions:
(1) The imposition ofjiscal discipline.
(2) The redirectionofpublicexpenditureprioritiestowards other fields.
(3) The introduction of taxreformsthat would lower marginal rates
and broaden the tax base.
(4) The liberalizationof the interestrate.
(5) A competitiveexchangerate.
(6) The liberalizationof the trade.
(7) The liberalizationof inflowsofforeign directinvestment.
(8) The privatization of state-owned economic enterprises.
(9) The deregulationof economic activities.
(10)The creation of a secureenvironmentfor propertyrights.
The theoretical foundations of these proposals can be easily
discerned. They are the usual analyses advanced by neo-liberal
economic theory. Economies are ih crisis because of impediments to
the free operation of the market. The impediments came from the
overinflated interventionist Keynesian state and its expansionary and
redistributive policies that deform market data and signals. The
solution, according to the neo-liberal mandra, would be the withdrawal
of the state from the economy and the reinstatement of the unhindered
operation of the market. Therefore, fiscal discipline should be imposed
on public activities and a return to the balanced budgets (as opposed
to the Keynesian deficit and expansionary budgets). The now limited
public expenditure should be directed towards fields that cover its cost
(possibly through the imposition of compensative payments) and
would support private entrepreneurship instead of paying for public
works and redistributive policies. Subsequently, the tax system should
be reformed so as not to hit hard business profits and the incomes of
the upper strata, which were conceived as the locomotive of the
economy. After all, the limited public expenditure can do with less
taxes. Additionally, the operation of the financial system should be
liberated from the state grip and prerogatives and be left to the free
operation of the market forces. Thus, the interest rate should be
determined more or less competitively. The withdrawal of the state
from the economy required, also, the privatization of all the activities
and enterprises that were state-owned and directed, the limitation to a
minimum of all state regulations and adequate guarantees that there
wont be any violations of property rights (as it had happened
previously with nationalisations etc.).
With the advent of the second,generation of neo-liberal theories,
which emphasised the opening of the economies, the previous set of
policy proposals was supplemented with three others that aimed to
the liberalisation ofinternational trade, capital movements and financial
activities. Thus, protectionist measures had to be abolished and free
trade movements established. Also, the free international movement
of capital investments had to be secured. And, last but not the least,
international financial transactions and, primarily, the exchange rate
of the currency had to be set according to market prerogatives and not
by state policies.
All these ideas had already been established as the orthodoxy in
the develdped countries in the 1980s.What the Washington Consensus
aimed to do was to introduce them in the developing and less
developed countries. As Williamson explicitly stated, there appeared
tobe asort ofglobal apartheid, which claimed that developing countries
came from a different universe which enabled them to benefit from (a)
inflation (so as to reap the inflation tax and boost investment); (b) a
leading role for the state in initiating industrialization; and (c)import
substitution. The Washington Consensus aimed to break this
differentiation. .
Quite soon, after its formal declaration, the Washington Consensus
came under criticism from many quarters. These criticisms emanated
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2003)and particularlya current associatedwith the work ofJ.Stiglitz
(1998a, 1998b)and also from Marxist Political Economy (Fine (2001a,
2001b, 2002), Shaikh (2003, 2004». An important point in this
controversy was the very definition of the term 'Washington
Consensus'. For nearly all its critics the term was synonymous with
neo-liberalism and a blind fundamentalism of the market.
Williamson (1997,2000,2004a) made a feeble defence of his term
arguing rather unconvincingly that it was not i~ his intentions a so
close identification of the term withneo-liberalism. He maintained that
he simply codified the consensus view within the big Washington
institutions and his concept was a mere technocratic formulation devoid
of ideological and political motivation. He also argued that his
'Washington Consensus' was not even apolicy prescription but simply
a list of policy reforms; although he is sympathetic to the former view
and he accepts that at the time of the introduction of the term these
two coincided (Williamson (2004a». However, he added that his
definition might be problematic in some aspects and also that he himself
had reservations on some ofthese. For example, in retrospect, he doubts
whether Washington institutions unanimously favoured the
competitively determined exchange rate and the rapid abolition of
capital controls. His reservations with the Washington Consensus'
policies were that their poverty reduction policies had to be more
emphasized and sophisticated and that a greater emphasis should be
put upon institutions and their role.
Despite Williamson's arguments it cannot be denied-and even he
cannot reject altogether-that the Washington Consensus has a definite
ideological and political background: that of the neo-conservative
policies of the last quarter of the 20th century. Furthermore, the
Washington Consensus cannot be delegated to a simple sum of policy
proposals. It has definitely a spinal column on the basis of which the
whole edifice has been constructed. This is implicitly accepted even
by Williamson when, in many papers, argues tl1atthere are three big
ideas behind the Washington Consensus: macroeconomic discipline,
market economy and opening of the economy (at least in respect of
trade and foreign direct investment). Washington Consensus'
macroeconomic discipline is of a particular type and has specific
priorities that differentiate it from other types of macroeconomic
orderly state of affairs. It has certainly nothing to do either with
Keynesian macroeconomic prerogatives or with those of other more
radical perspectives. In almost all cases it led to austerity budgets and
policies that favoured the wealthier and worsen the position of the
lower strata. The same holds for the push towards a market economy
and the opening ofthe economy. The firststems from a neoconservative
conception of the economic role of the state and of its alleged inability
to manage properly the economy. The second has the same origins
complimented with the simplistic belief that it will lead. to increased
competition and thus consumers will in the end be better off.As it will
be shown in the next chapter, these had the same negative effects as
the first big idea. In this sense, the Washington Consensus is a
perspective that dictated a policy prescription. Indeed, under its
auspices, numerous reform programs were imposed-w'illingly or
unwillingly-on less developed or developing countries.
The controversy about the definition established rightfully a
meaning for the term. The actual content of a term is not given by the
intentions ofitsfounders but by the broader socio-political environment
and the practical outcomes of the policies dictated by the term. On
these grounds, it is overwhelmingly clear that .inthe 1980s and 1990s
there predominated in official circles a current that considered as its
main task the abolition of the state-run development policies and the
restoration of the free operation of the market disregarding costs and
special features of the developing economies. This current was clearly
associated with neo-liberal theory and the Washington Consensus was
its arm in the field of Development theory and policy. Consequently,
the discussion of the concept cannot be constrained to the limited
agenda ofissues that its creator proposed but must encompass itswhole
spectrum of theory and applications. Williamson (2002) himself soon
conceded the argument accepting that, from the time that the term
became public property, its meaning is being set by the wider
perception about it. Therefore, he declared that there is no meaning in
struggling for the content of the term and called for an issue-by-issue
discussion of the proposed policies.
WASHINGTON CONSESUS AND ITS CONSEQUENSES
Besides the controversy on its definition, there is also a heated debate
on whether the Washington Consensus promoted the development of
developing and less developed economies or not. Today there is a
widespread perception that it failed and that it led to crises and
impoverishment. It would not be unfair to state that the term truly
carries a bad reputation. This is accepted even by its defenders as, for
example, by Naim (2002) who acknowledged that the Washington
Consensus is a 'damaged brand name'. Criticisms and the concomitant
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opposition to the Washington Consensus but, most of all, from a series
ofpersisting problems and crises that are,rightly orwrongly, associated
with it.
Increase in Poverty, Inability to Catch-up and Social Upheavals
After the first years of implementation of Washington Consensus
policies and reforms there was a growing sense, among friends and
foes, that it failed its promises. More specifically, from the late 1990s
and onwards, the Washington Consensus was facing major difficulties
regarding a number of issues, which were not included in its declared
objectives but are crucial for the development process. It was criticized
for failing to organize a 'human face' adjustment process and, thus,
for causing social upheavals. Additionally, it was criticized for failing
to deliver significant advances in performance, let alone development.
Several studies argued that its policies led to an increase in poverty
and inequality both between developed and developing and less
developed economies and within themselves. Additionally, the
apparent inability ofdeveloping and lessdeveloped economies to catch-
up the level of growth of the developed ones and, in many cases, the
increase of the gap between them were attributed also to the policies
instigated by the Washington Consensus.
The first criticism, 'adjustment with a human face', touched upon
the many cases where reforms dictated by the Washington Consensus
had led to abrupt changes and a disruption of social cohesion. The
imperatives of the Washington Consensus' policies were usually
implemented in atechnocratic manner, disregarding socialand political
complexities. This, in return, created major prob.1emsand led to social
and political upheaval. This was particularly true in cases of'shock
treatment' reforms.
The aforementioned criticism was also closely linked to the second
one, Le. the inability to exhibit an unambiguously better economic
performance and to promote development. Issues of poverty, the
environment, and of women's position, had been overlooked drawing
criticism over both the desirability and the efficacy of adjustment
policies. Of all these issues ofparticular importance came to be the rise
in inequality and poverty (see Atkinson (1999a».
For almost all critics, Washington Consensus' inability to address
issues of poverty and inequality lays in its analytical perspective. The
Washington Consensus held the view that poverty and inequality were
problems of a secondary order, which more or less would have been
alleviated once the market was free to operate undisturbed by the
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impediments ofineffectivestate intervention. Inparticular, itwas thought
that if the domestic markets where liberated from any impediments,
then the freeoperation ofcapital,domestically,but mainly internationally
will provide all the stimulation and the efficiencynecessary for feasible
development (see Kozul-Wright &Rayment (2004».
Against this market-fundamentalist presumption, most ofthe critics
point out that during the last twenty years of the 20thcentury after the
implementation of Washington Consensus' policies and structural
changes there was a marked increase of poverty and inequality (see
Chossudovsky (1997». Critics coming from the Marxist Political
Economy stream attribute this upsurge to the class nature of the
Washington Consensus, Le. that it is a set of policies that promotes
capitalist interests and moreover the interests ofbig imperialist powers.
Some mainstream critics argue that advocates of the Washington
Consensus confront only the so-called 'traditional causes' ofinequality
(such as land concentration, dominance of natural resources, imequal
access to education, and urban bias (in pricing policies, allocation of
public expenditure and investment and so on». For them, while such
traditional factors were clearly responsible for the high-income
concentration observed in the 1950sthrough 1970sand their persistence
at a high level in the subsequent two decades, they cannot (with the
possible exception, in some regions, of educational inequality) explain
the widespread surge in inequality observed over the past twenty years
of the Washington Consensus. Instead, several 'new' factors - such as
technological changes with 'new technologies' generating a demand
for skills and an earnings distribution more skewed than the emanating
'old technologies' - have had more relevance to the recent rise in
inequality. This critique might be pertinent but it is beyond doubt that
the Washington Consensus cannot address even the 'traditional caUSes'
of inequality.
1Jte Crises of the 1990s
The problems mentioned above were brought forward and emphasized
in the mid-1990s after a series of crises in the developing world: the
1994-5Mexican 'Tequila' crisis, the 1997Asian crisis, the 1997-9Russian
'Vodka' crisis, the 1998Brazilian crisis and finally the 2000Argentinean
crisis. In all these cases, the Washington Consensus policy prescriptions
were blamed since these crises happened while these countries were
implementing -itspolicies and structural reforms. A common feature
ofall these cases is that they ended up as exchange rate crises. However,
it is also true that ea.chcase had its own specific characteristics.SO/BULLETIN OF POLmCAL ECONOMY
In the first case, Mexico, the problems were caused by the attempt
to open the economy and introduce financial liberalisation. This led to
the collapse of the peso and the default of the Mexican debt. In the
Asian case the crisis was caused by the attempts to conform to an
international environment a-la Washington Consensus and at the same
time to reform their internal structure away from the Asian
developmental model and towards the Washington Consensus
prescriptions. The crisis took again the form ohn exchange rate crisis
and led to abrupt abandonment of these reforms. The Russian case is
different since it stems from the transition process towards a market
economy. Shock adjustment policies, the opening of the economy and
its increased financialization made it vulnerable to contagion effects
of the Asian crisis. This caused the collapse of the stock market,
subsequent devaluations of the rouble and finally the suspension of
its convertibility. In the Brazilian case the attempt to ir1troducefinancial
liberalisation backfired. The imposition of fiscal discipline by
redirecting public expenditure towards other fields and the reform of
the tax system towards Washington Consensus standards demolished
the Brazilian fiscal and tax system. This led to an exchange rate crisis
again. Finally, the Argentinean case encompasses all the features of
the Washington Consensus prescription. It began with an ambitious
plan of budget, trade and monetary reform and quite soon proceeded
to a currency board, Le.the pegging of the peso to the US dollar on an
one-to-one basis. These reforms created serious problems in the
economy and led to the biggest sovereign default in modern history.
A closer look to each of these cases will enlighten the inherent
problems of the Washington Consensus prescriptions and the causes
of itsbad reputation. .
The 1994-5Mexican peso crisis could be classified as a Balance of
Payments crisis. The rapid liberalization of domestic markets caused
imports to grow much more rapidly than exports. Tight monetary
policy to reduce inflation produced high interest rates, which attracted
foreign capital inflows to deregulatedand liberalized domestic financial
markets, which financed the trade gap. It was attempted to introduce
competitive exchange rates, whic:tlimplied that domestic interest rates
had to be liberalised. But this caused the real appreciation of the peso,
which worsened further the trade balance by turning relative prices
against exports. The capital inflows also encouraged import growth as
foreign borrowing allowed domestic banks to compete for domestic
market share by lending to households to finance consumption and to
arrange foreign exchange loans to domestic business at international
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interest rates. The result was continually increasing Mexican payments
deficit, along with record increases in bank's non-performing loans, a
fall in private savings and low domestic investment, with slow growth
and rising unemployment accompanying a fall in the rate of inflation
and a government budget surplus. In February 1994, the increase of
USinterest rates led towithdrawal ofinvestors and, thus, tothe collapse
of the peso (Le.the inability to keep its peg to the dollar) and finally to
the. default of the Mexican dept. However, the crisis would have
occurred irrespectively of the reversal of US interest rate policy since
the real appreciation of the peso would eventually have collided with
the increasing external deficit, and Mexico would have experienced
an exchange rate crisis that would have been aggravated by a domestic
financial crisis due to bad bank loans to households and foreign
currency exposure of business clients.
The Asian crisis of 1997 has been very different. Most of the
countries engulfed in it (Thailand, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Inqonesia
and to a certain extent Malaysia) had no macroeconomic imbalances.
Yet, there was a discernible tendency towards deterioration in foreign
account caused by a fall-off in the rapid growth of exports in most
countries. But, this was caused not by changes in what had until that
time been successful internal stabilization policy (following the Asian
developmental model), but rather by changes in the external
environment (towards Washington Consensus standards), over which
they had little control and there were few policy responses available.
This is a characteristic of the world of increased economic
interdependence and free global capital flows. Thus, unlike Mexico,it
is impossible to argue that excessive domestic bank lending and real
exchange rate appreciation led to a consumption and import boom
which eventually created an expanding foreign deficit that speculators
recognised as unsustainable since both the real exchange rate
appreciations and the increased domestic bank lending occurred well
after the beginning of the decline in trade balances and the increase in
foreign bank lending. Rather, the process appears to have been the
opposite. It was the rise in short-term bank inflows and the decline in
the developed countries' demand in the presence of liberalization of
domestic financial markets that led to the deterioration in the trade
balance, which was then further aggravated by dollar appreciation and
rapid domestic credit expansion. It is for this reason that the crisis was
not a foreign exchange crisis caused by a payments imbalance, since
there was no clear evidence that exchange rates were inappropriate.
Reserves were extremely large, external balances were moving in the52/ BULLETIN OFPOLmCALECONOMY
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right direction and official international agency assessmentsof country
fU!ldamentals suggested that the external positions were sustainable
at existing exchange rates.
In the Russian caseof 1997-9the crisis followed a different path.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a transition process to a
market economy was initiated. Policies of shock adjustment to a
liberalised, privatised and open economyw:ere systematically
employed. The result was the tremendous transfer of wealth and
resources to a handful of previously unknown foreign capitalists and
to groups of previous managers. On the other hand the Russian
economy shrank considerably and large segments of the population
were impoverished. The opening and the financialisation of the
economy brought foreign investors to the Russian stock market both
for easy hefty returns and in order to diversify their portfolios. When
the Asian crisis occurred in 1997 many of them withdraw from the
Russian market in order to cover losses in Asia while the IMF made
the same mistake it made in Asia, i.e. pressing the Russian government
to go further to the liberalisation of the economy towards Washington
Consensus standards. Thus, in June 18th1998 it delayed a $670 million
tranche of a loan to Russia. After that the Russian government
succumbed to the IMF demands and increased land taxes. Although
the IMF released the loan and also gave an additional one, political
and social tensions (e.g. a miners' strike) scared investors, who
withdrew for a second time from the Russian market. This ultimately
led to the fall of several governments and, despite initial refusals, to
subsequent big devaluations of the rouble forcing - in the end - the
suspension of its convertibility.
In the caseof Brazil the whole affair was born out of the neoliberal
fixation with hyperinflation which existed but, contrary to other Latin
American economies, was not creating significant problems as the
foreign account was not excessively imbalanced, the exchange rate was
not overvalued, net public debt as a share of GDP was declining, and
while low from historical perspective, its growth rate was on average
above other economies in the region. Following the neo-liberal mandras
active fiscal policy and the monetary control were abandoned and high
real interest rates were used in order to stem hyperinflation. However,
this reinforced hyperinflation by causing:
. a direct increase in the costs of capital since there was no long-
term capital market,
. an increase in the government deficit, since the outstanding
debt was directly linked to short-term rates.
. an increase in the rate of inflation through the impact on capital
costsand on thefiscalimbalance.
The reinforced inflation spiralled into indexed inertial
hyperinflation, and impeded the full development ofprivate long-term
capital markets. Thus when policies of market liberalization were
introduced according to the Washington Consensus prescriptions - to
replace the system of.government directed development financing -
there was no private sector market structure available to take its place.
The financial system operated as a rentier on the float created by the
adjustment lags in the indexing system of financial contracts. Indeed,
there was hardly any long-term business financing to be done. Only
the State continued to invest in any appreciable magnitude and this
peculiarly Brazilian characteristic of efficient state financing of
investment was under increasing attack from the rapid deterioration
of government finances and the neo-liberal push towards increased
liberalisation. Then the Real plan was introduced, which was in many
respects similar to earlier reform plans (e.g. de-indexing of wages and
prices, using the nominal exchange rate astheanchor forprice stability).
Nonetheless, interest rates continued to be the major instrument of
economic policy. Its implementation had as a consequence the reversal
of the exchange rate policy of the previous period from maintaining
competitiveness through devaluation to maintaining competitiveness
by creating pressure on domestic producers from foreign imports. Since
it was difficult for domestic producers to adjust their costs rapidly; the
real appreciation of the Real produced a growing payments imbalance
in the new context of liberalised foreign trade. The foreign capital
inflows that matched the growing trade imbalance also had an impact
on fiscal conditions, since the Central Bank adopted a policy of
sterilization of inflows in order toprotect itsinflation-fighting monetary
policy. As result, the continued reliance on high interest rates reinforced
the imbalances on the foreign and domestic (fiscal) accounts and
reversed the economy from one of inertial inflation to tendential
deflation. This ultimately led to an exchange rate crisis.
Notwithstanding, the Argentinean is the most characteristic of all
the crises caused by the Washington Consensus prescriptions and, at
the same time, the most severe one. Argentina is the country that most
enthusiastically embraced the economic model promoted by the IMF
and the U.S. Treasury: market liberalization, opening to foreign
investment (particularly foreign direct investment) and a reduced role
for the state in the direct production of goods and services, but also as
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was promoted asa model showcasetill December2001when it fell
dramatically from grace. All started in 1991,when the finance minister
Domingo Cavalho, under the auspices of the IMF, introduced his
budget, trade and monetary reform plan. This was a series ofeconomic
shocks, followed by the subsequent introduction of a currency board,
which had as its primary aim to fight hyperinflation and to stabilize
the economy following the standards setby the Wa~hington Consensus.
The balancing of the budget was achieved first, through extensive
privatisations, tax reforms, cuts in state expenditure, etc. The
achievement of fiscal discipline was immediately followed by the
tightening of monetary policy,which allowedfor the introduction of
themostrevolutionaryofallthereforms,acurrencyboard linkingthe
domestic currency, the Argentinean peso on a 1:1basis to the dollar.
The introduction of this parity aimed at anchoring permanently
Argentine's I;Ilonetarypolicy to the US, in order to make the former
more credible both domestically and internationally with regard to
the stabilization of the economy and permanent price stability. It was
one of the first dollarisation experiments. However, the linkage of the
peso to the US dollar and consequently directly to the US monetary
policy, meant that the Argentinean monetary policy had to adjust
towards the needs and aims of the Americaninterest rate policy.As
the Argentinean interest rates had to follow the US interest rates in
order to keep the parity of thepeso tothe dollar,thisput tremendous
pressure on the domestic economy. Asa result, exports felldramatically
while imports increased, business defaults increased, unemployment
increased, government tax revenue fell dramatically, and a domestic
debt-deflation process started affecting the banking system and
increasing dependence on external capital flows in order to keep the
currency board. The process ended by the end of 2001, when two
interrelated events accelerated the crisis. Firstly, on 6 November,
Argentina's sovereign credit rating was downgraded to 'sovereign
default', following the decision of President Fernando De la Rua's
governmenttocarryout a distresseddebtexchange.Thisresultedina
panicky run on banks, which culminated in deposits decreasing by
US$1.8billionon the singleday of 30November.On 3December,the
De la Rua government imposed a freezeon bank deposits known as
the 'corralito' ('little fence'). Thisseverely limited the amount ofmoney
that could be withdrawn from banks accounts, and trapped many
people's savings in failing banks. On 5December, the IMFannounced
that it was suspending loans to Argentina because the De la Rua
government had failed to meet conditions on public-spending cuts,
and refused to disburse ascheduled $1.3billion SpecialDrawing Rights
tranche needed to pay debt obligations and to support the currency
peg.
Thecombinationof thesetwoeventsled toaprocess that brought
the Argentinean economic,politicaland socialsystemto the brink of
meltdown, crystallizinga longer-termprocess of crisis.Widespread
political unrest erupted as a result, and on 20December, as the protests
intensified, De la Rua resigned. Argentina then went through five
nominal heads of statein ten days.During this politicalturmoil, the
dollar-peso parity was abandoned and Argentina defaulted on its debt
of about US$150billion. The countrywide protests diminished after
the fall of De la Rua, but discontent has simmered on, particularly as
the economy has gone into free fall. The Argentinean economy
contracted dramatically, with GDP falling by a record 16% and
manufacturing output falling by almost 20%in the first quarter of2002,
and industrial production in general by 17% during the first seven
months of 2002.The currency collapsed to about one quarter of its
original value, and inflation has spiralled. Unemployment has soared,
public services have disintegrated, schools have closed, and state
pensions and public sector workers' salaries have gone unpaid.
Williamson«2004b)p.6, (2004a)p.11-12)makes anunconvincing
atte~pt to divorce his definition of the WashingtonConsensus from
the Argentinean fiasco.Although he praises the rest of the Cavalho
reforms (and indeed Cavalho himself) he disavows (a) the imposition
of afixed exchap.geratewhichbecameovervaluedand, (b)the lackof
anorderlyfiscalsystemwhichmadeimpossibletheuseofthesurpluses
of the boom years in order to bring down the debt/GDP ratio. Both
arguments are weak.
The currency board was the way to rapidly control hyperinflation.
Otherwise a more smooth process would have been adopted. The shock
adjustment was chosen because otherwise the whole process might be
derailed. The currency peg to dollar was hailed as a bold new attempt
to push even further, more rapidly and beyond the point of return the
Washington Consensus prescriptions. In this way the peso was
supposed to acquire more credibility and since this other currency was
the dominant international currency, to reflect the operation ofan open
liberalised economy. Thus, the exchange rate would be competitively
determined without any state intervention or old 'Latin stratagems'
(Le.the silent devaluation of the currency in order to acquire trade
competitiveness). ThUs, its subsequent disavowal sounds as ex post
sophistry. On the other hand, the fiscal system and the indebtness of56 / BULLETINOF POLITICAL ECONOMY
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the Argentinean economy got out of control not because of the lack of
fiscalorder or a high debt/ GDP ratio but exactly because ofthe attempt
to impose internal macroeconomic' discipline' and external openness
almost automatically through the currency board.
FRIENDS AND FOESOFTHEWASHINGTON CONSESUS
Three broad streams can be discerned regarding the evaluation of the
Washington Consensus. The first stream encenipasses its defenders
and supports, critically or uncritically, its legacy. The second one stems
also from neoclassical economic theory but assesses negatively the
impact of the Washington Consensus and also disputes part of its
analytical framework. This second stream is associated with the post-
Washington Consensus argument. Finally, there is a third stream
coming from Marxist ana Radical Political Economy that not only
assesses negatively the impact of the Washington Consensus but also
adheres to acompletely opposite analytical and ideological perspective.
Reformists and Fundamentalists
The supporters of the Washington Consensus are subdivided in two
camps. The first one comprises of the fundamentalists that argue that
the failures of the Washington Consensus were the result of faulty
implementation and reluctant reformers (e.g. Krueger (2000),Franco
(1999». The sec.ond camp argues that there should be 'a reform of the
reforms', i.e. that despite Washington Consensus merits it is necessary
areappraisal ofits agenda (e.g.Kuczynski &Williamson (2003),ECLAC
(1995),Ffrench-Davis (2000».
For the fundamentalists both the neo-liberal character and the
policy prescriptions are correct. What went wrong isthe way they were
applied. Thus, in pushing through the reforms careful consideration
has to be given to state capacity, bureaucratic constraints and agency
problems. Issues ofeffective governance and even' second-best options'
have to be taken into account. There is, however, a new element that
creeps in their defence of the Washington Consensus. By focusing on
these issues, they have to pay attention to the role of the institutions;
an elementrather alien to the pure versions ofthe neo-liberal approach.
However, a growing majority of the adherents to the Washington
Consensus recognizes that its problems are much more serious than
simply implementation errors. This approach has been enforced by
internal disagreements within mainstream economics. The poor record
of the Washington Consensus has caused significant urieasiness within
the mainstream~ which culminated, from the mid-1990s and onwards,
to aseries ofcritiques (e.g.Fisher (2003),Krugman (1990),Rodrik (1992),
Sachs (1987». For these critics the original version is too rigid (by
disregarding intermediate positions between the extremes 9f
indiscriminate liberalization and arbitrary interventionism) and jumps
to policy recommendations bC/sedsimply on the maximization of
liberalization. Thus, a search for a reformist version began. Several
versions of this have been proposed ('reform of the reforms',
'augmented Washington Consensus' etc.). Williamson (2003, p.237)
himself led this process by acknowledging that the results of even his
definition of the Washington Consensus have been disappointing for
three main reasons:
(1) As proved by the series of crises, the Washington Consensus
did not emphasized crisis avoidance. Additionally, it is guilty
for reckless enthusiasm for capital account liberalization.
(2) The reforms were incomplete, particularly regarding the labour
market where dualism persisted. Also fiscal reform did
eliminate budget deficits but did not foresaw to create in good
times surpluses as abuffer forbad times when deficit spending
is required. Additionally, there was a disregard for reform of
institutions and good governance.
(3) The objectives of the reforms were narrow (simply to restore
. growth)withoutconcernforemployment,incomedistribution,
poverty and other social issues.
However, he argues that these failures do not necessitate the
abandonment of the Washington Consensus, nor giving socialism
another chance or introducing industrial policy or closing the economy.
ForWilliamson (2003,p.330),the way forward isto liberalise the labour
market but in a civilized way, to improve income distribution and to
recognize the role of institutions. He even plays down the differences
with the post-Washington Consensus critics by arguing that their sole
difference is that the latter presents its agenda as a repudiation of the
WC whereas he argues for its continuation and reform. Similarly,
Williamson (2004a, p.1) applauds - with minor.corrections- Rodrik's
(2002)Augmented Washington Consensus, despite the latter's explicit
rejection of its fea~ibility (see Rodrik (2002, p.1). Rodrik has argued
that in the end ofthe 1990semerged a revised version ofthe Washington
Consensus, which augments the initial agenda with the following items:
(1) Corporate governance
(2) Anti-corruption
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(4) WTO agreements
(5) Financial codes and standards
(6) 'Prudent' capital-account opening
(7) Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes
(8) Independent central banks/inflation targeting
(9) Social safety nets
(10)Targeted poverty reduction
In a similar vein, Ffrench-Davis (2000)and ECLAC (1995) offer a
mixed account ofthe impact ofWashington Consensus reforms on Latin
American economies and argue forthe need ofa 'reform ofthe refonns'.
For them, the initial reforms imposed macroeconomic discipline on
local authorities, defeated hyperinflation, improved budget balances
and fiscal savings and promoted exports. On the other hand, new
imbalances were caused (particularly regarding the external sector),
policies were too rigid and could not adapt to changes in the
macroeconomy and social dimensions were neglected, thus causing social clashes.
To a large extent the reformists attempt to drop the overtly neo-
liberal character of the Washington Consensus by attacking neo-liberal
fundamentalism and arguing for a practical policy-oriented debate
rather than ideological and general-theoretical controversies. They also
emphasize the role ofinstitutions-which is a shy alias to the state-and
the importance of social issues (such as poverty and equity). They,
therefore, concur-setting aside individual grievances-with aspects of
the post-Washington Consensus thesis although they, usually, reject the label.
with the Washington Consensus, where the state is not seen as a
corrective power. It contrasts also with the old Keynesian big
government policies. Theearly Keynesian opposition tothe Washington
Consensus has often accepted the latter's terms of debate, Le. to
counterpose the state and the market and to favour state intervention
whether in getting prices wrong, picking winners, or guiding the private
sector through public expenditure. On the contrary, for Stiglitz (1998a,
p.25) there cannot be a return to old Keynesian policies but the state
mustfocus exclusively on what he calls fundamentals, Le. economic
policies, appropriate regulation, industrial policy, social protection,
basic education, health, infrastructure, law and order, environmental
protection. For him the question is not whether the state should or
should not be involved, but rather the question of how it should be
involved. His main argument is that the state is not anti-market force
but a complementary one.
On this alternative analytical approach are based the 'New
Development Economics' (Nobel (2001» and the post-Washington
Consensus, which emphasise history and institutions. Through the
emphasis on institutions it attempts tobring the social dimension back
into the analysis as the means ofaddressing, and potentially correcting,
market imperfections. It also aIms to differentiate itself from old
Keynesian statism.
For Stiglitz (1994, 1998a, 1998b) the Washington Consensus fails
because the simple liberalization of markets does not suffice for their
normal operation, particularly in the developing countries. The
existence of information asymmetries, that prevent markets from
allocating resources efficiently, and the lack of complete and efficient
institutional systems to mitigate these asymmetries are the causes of
this failure. Thus, development policy should not aim only to the
markets but also to the institutions. In a sense, the post-Washington
Consensus shares the same agenda with itspredecessor but with some
crucial modifications. The removal of the constraints and controls on
the markets and the international capital mobility and privatizations
should be done through a smooth and gradual process and by taking
into account the specific historical and social situations. Essential part
ofthis process isthe creation ofnew institutional regulatory frameworks
that can guide, correct and control the market. Moreover, more room is
allowed for discretionary and active policies. On top ofall these, Stiglitz
rejects the Washington Consensus monistic focus on fighting inflation
and puts priority on the stabilization of output and the promotion of
long-run growth (through education, transfer oftechnology and several
Post-Washington Consensus: A Critique from Within
The post-Washington Consensus thesis, launched in 1998 by Joseph
Stiglitz, is the most ambitious attempt to resolve the Washington
Consensus problems, from within mainstream economics. What
distinguishes it from other mainstream critiques of the Washington
Consensus is that it is sharply critical of the latter and that it is based
on a differentiated analytical approach, the 'economics ofinformation'.
For Stiglitz (1989),there is no perfect information, as the neoclassical
mainstream posits. mstead, informational asymmetries exist which
allow for transaction costs and market imperfections. Thus, the
definition of market imperfections is broadened and the argument for
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other channels that are being neglected by the Washington Consensus).
Finally, he emphasizes the role of the financial system (the 'brain' of
the economy) and argues that the aim should not be a liberalized
financial system but a properly regulated and efficient one.
The Radical Critique: Capitalism's Structural Problems and the
Developing Countries .
There is also a more radical critique of both the Washington and the
post-Washington Consensuses coming from the Marxist Political
Economy. This approach follows a different analytical course by
focusing on social classes and the struggle between them rather than
on maximising individuals (as both Consensuses do). In this context
the Washington Consensus is a vehicle for the exertion of imperialist
dominance by the developed capitalist economies (and primarily the
US)over the developing and less developed countries. Its set ofpolicies
advances the specific interests of these economies, which are similarly
advanced with the so-called globalisation.
Thus, Shaikh (2003, 2004) disputes that trade and financial
liberalisation promotes development, as both the Washington and the
post-Washington Consensus (more qualified) believe. Empirically, the
now developed economies have, in the past, systematically used activist
and protectionist trade and financial policies in order to attain their
present status and, in many cases, they follow them even today. Also,
as even mainstreamers accept (e.g. Rodrik (2001), p.7), it has been
proven that liberalisation policies do not lead to higher growth rates.
Thus, the pressure the pressure toliberalise favo~s the developed over
the developing by prohibiting for the latter to follow the path of the
former. Shaikh, also, shows that these ill-guided policies stem from
the erroneous orthodox 'theory of comparative costs' and he argues
that an approach based on the classical theory of 'competitive
advantage' is both analytically and empirically superior.
Similarly, Fine (2001a, 2001b, 2002) criticises the Washington
Consensus for consciously neglecting crucial aspects of the
development process in order to push the neo-liberal reforms that
promote the interests of domina.nt capitalist economies. He also
criticises the post-Washington Consensus for not being a true
alternative to its predecessor and for, ultimately sharing the same
analytical and policy agenda. Despite its vociferous opposition, it
actually shares the same analytical foundations, namely methodological
individualism, with the additionally flavour of the emphasis on
informational asymmetries. This reductionism toindividual behaviour,
even when supplemented with an emphasis on institutions, cannot
grasp the social dimension and moreover class and power relations.
Furthermore, despite again Stiglitz's new found focus on history, it
cannot grasp the qualitative dimensions of development and
particularly its nature as a transition from one stage of development to
another and reduces it to the arrangements required for dealing with
market imperfections. Finally, Fine argues that both Consensuses are
part ofthe same 'imperialist' attempt by orthodox economics to colonise
fields (such as Economic Development theory), which have hitherto
remain no-go areas.
On policy issues, Marxist economists argue that markets, instead
of promoting stability and equality, are potential destabilisers and that
freecompetition increases poverty and inequality. This holds especially
for financial liberalisation and international capital mobility, which -
as the experience ofthe 1990sreconfirmed -increase domestic financial
fragi,lity and trigger balance of payments crises. Additionally,
financialisation drains resources that might have fostered the growth
of production and employment and increases unproductively the
returns of financial intermediaries. Finally, they claim that unbridled
competition leads to the concentration and centralisation ofcapital and,
thus, to the creation of national and international monopolies, which
impose their interests on the poorer strata and the less developed
economies. Ultimately, this process leads to growing divergence
between economies, contrary to the orthodox beliefs. In terins of the
domestic economy, the Washington Consensus' policies lead toadverse
income distribution, since they put the onus on the poorer strata and
they systematically erode workers' bargaining power (viagreater wage
flexibility, reduced regulation and minimum wages). Adverse income
distribution worsens even more with privatisations (that make more
costly the provision of utilities) and the erosion of the state's
redistributive role (through regressive changes in taxation systems and
the curtailment of public expenditure).
For the radical critique the way forward for the developing
countries is neither the Washington nor the post-Washington
Consensus. Instead, another developmental model is required in which
the state must have an explicitly active role in promoting trade and
industrial policies and positive income redistribution. Moreover, these
new state economic functions should be democratically accountable
and based on popular movements. Such an alternative developmental
strategy wou~d necessarily have to strive against hegemonical
international economic relations.62 / BULLETINOF POLITICAL ECONOMY
DEVELOPMENT AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM
In the beginning of the 21"1century the Washington Consensus is,
nominally at least, dead. However, the way forward is farfrom obvious.
From a l<mg-runpoint ofview the world economy is still living in
the aftermath ofthe 1973structural crisis.The factthat since then almost
all the crucial macroeconomic variables exhibit a'rather dismal record
is tantamount to that. This crisis ended the previous modus operandi
of capitalism and called for a new architecture of the system. From the
perspective ofMarxist Political Economy, this was not a simple periodic
overaccumulation crisis, but its structural character had to do with the
exhaustion of the core elements (relation between paid and unpaid
labour time, production and circulation processes, social and political
edifice etc.). The first systemic attempt to overcome it followed the
prescriptions of the then economic orthodoxy, Le.Keynesianism. Thus,
conservative Keynesian policies were employed. Their main feature
was that they regarded the crisis simply as an underconsumption one
and attempted to solve it via a contradictory reinforcement ofdemand.
In particular, they resorted to austerity measures (where the curtail of
any wage increases reduced workers' income and the labour cost and
promoted profitability) and state policies (tax cutting, state orders and
subsidies) that supported capitalist consumption and the demand
between capitalist enterprises, These policies failed, in the long -run,
because they weakened intra-capitalist competition, thus deterring the
destruction of less competitive capitals.
Then followed the neo-conservative currents, first with their
national (monetarism) and then with their internationalised (neo-
liberalism) version. Some of their main features were the emphasis on
the supply-side, the permission to competition to work unhindered,
the withdrawal of the state from the economy and also its opening.
The withdrawal ofthe state form economic activities created new spaces
for capitalist profitability through the privatisations (seldom at
basement prices). Itcurtailed also the ability ofthe working and popular
classes to press for concessions and economic benefits. Together with
the liberalisation of internal and external markets, it applied in all
markets (including the labour market and for this reason neo-
conservatism's attack on workers' position was much more severe than
that of conservative Keynesianism) rules of strict competition. These
permitted the full application of the clearing force of competition (the
survival of the fittest)-with limited ability of the state to adulterate
this process-as a means of overcoming the crisis. The Washington
Consensus isthe brainchild ofthese currents in the fieldofDevelopment
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theory and policy. As such it has similar merits but also suffers from
similar deficiencies with its developed countries' blueprints. It has
sustained capitalist profitability in the mid-run by providing new areas
for investment, reducing labour wage and non-wage costs and clearing
the economy from unviable individual capitals. On the other hand, by
overemphasising the role of competition it fall to the naive belief that
simply the spontaneous action of individual capitals will suffice to
return the capitalist economy to another' golden era' of accumulation.
However, there exist significant contradictions between individual and
collective capitalist interests and for this reason the role of the state, as
a 'collective capitalist', is necessary. Furthermore, the width and the
depth of the capitalist restructuring required to surpass the structural
crisis necessitates much more than the spontaneous action ofthe market
forces.This is another reason why the state isrequired as a commanding
centre, which will guide, motivate and correct the market.
These inabilities lie at the heart of the failures of neo-liberalism
and of the Washington Consensus. Tantamount to that is the renewed
emphasis-either by its supporters or by its mainstream critics-on the
role of institutions. For these reasons both neo-liberalism and the
Washington Consensus are virtually dated in the beginning of the 21"1
century and the search began for their successors. Social-liberalist trends
appear as suchasuccessor and the post-Washington Consensus is part
of them. Their main trust is that they represent a rupture within the
continuum of neo-liberalism. They built upon its successes but also
strive to correct its deficiencies. Thus a new role for the state-
headquarter is researched and also, in the face pf serious social
upheavals, a more sophisticated form of attacks on and compromises
with the working class and the other popular classes.
However, this new emerging orthodoxy has its own deficiencies
and, in the cases ofthe post-Washington Consensus, the radical critiq!le
is very accurate on that. In analytical terms, its critique against the
Washington Consensus correctly pinpoints its non-social character and
its inability to grasp the socia-political dimensions of the development
process. However, this defect cannot be repaired by simply adding a
role for the state and the institutions to combat market imperfections
caused by informational asymmetries and conceived on the basis of
methodological individualism. The sodo-political dimensions ofthe
development problem are far wider, cannot be grasped properly even
by 'socialised' versions of methodological individualism and require
more radical and rigorous instruments than simple institution-
building. In a sense, where the Washington Consensus creates (or64 / BULLETIN OF POLmCAL ECONOMY
expands) markets-and in some cases where this cannot be done it
creates quasi-markets by imposing private-sector modes of operation-
the post-Washington Consensus attempts to create quasi-societies as
complements to the markets. It neglects that it is social and class
interests that create institutional frameworks and rules -and som.etimes
even markets. Furthermore, the division in different social and class
interests is not the result of more or less fleeting informational
asymmetries but of more fundamental and deep-rooted socio-political
factors. For all these reasons and despite the valiant critique of its
proponent against its predecessor, it seems that the most that the post-
Washington Consensus can offeris a compromise with the former.
This is probably bound to produce similar dismal results with the
Washington Consensus regarding the development process. The only
area where it may have a limited success is in a form of gatopardismo-
to borrow from Lucino Viscodi's famous film: everything in the system
has to be changed in order for the system to remain unchanged.
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